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LAW REFORM ONLINE
COMMENT

EMINENT DOMAIN FOR THE SEIZURE OF UNDERWATER
MORTGAGES
Sarah Thompson*
Like many cities in the United States, Richmond, California
suffered greatly from the recent mortgage crisis. The foreclosure
crisis hit Richmond hard in 2009, when more than 2,000 homes in
Richmond went into foreclosure. 1 This figure is especially
shocking given that there were 18,659 owner-occupied housing
units in the city at that time. 2 In 2012, the city saw an additional
914 foreclosures and a foreclosure rate of thirty out of 1,000
homes (well above the national average of thirteen of every 1,000
homes). 3 Today, it is reported that nearly forty-six percent of
homes in Richmond are “underwater,” meaning that what is owed
on the mortgage is more than the current value of the property. 4
Seeking to put an end to the foreclosures, the City of Richmond
announced a plan on July 30, 2013 to use the power of eminent
domain to buy underwater mortgages from lenders. 5 The city
plans to buy the mortgages for eighty percent of a home’s current
value, a price they believe is high enough to amount to the just
compensation that is required by the Fifth Amendment’s
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1.
KRIS HARTLEY, RICHMOND EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, TRANSFORMING
THE HOUSING CRISIS IN RICHMOND 4 (2009).
2.
City of Richmond, BAY AREA CENSUS, http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/cities/Rich
mond.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
3.
Robert Rogers, Richmond Mortgage Crisis: By the Numbers, CONTRA COSTA TIMES
(May 25, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.contracostatimes.com/ci_23317434/richmondmortgage-crisis-similar-yet-unique-within-nationwide.
4.
E. Scott Reckard, Richmond Plan to Seize Underwater Loans Faces Key
Challenges, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/lafi-mo-richmond-eminent-domain-mortgages-20130910,0,2114249.story.
5.
Les Christie, California city’s drastic foreclosure remedy; Seizure, CNN MONEY
(July 30, 2013, 2:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/30/real_estate/richmondunderwater-homes/.
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protection against the taking of private property. 6 Richmond
would then convert the acquired mortgages into FHA loans with
smaller principals that correspond with the current value of the
home. 7 FHA loans are insured against default by the Federal
Housing Authority (a section of the United States Department of
Housing Development) and are issued by private, FHA-approved
lenders. On August 7, 2013, several banks representing the bond
investors that owned these underwater mortgages filed suit
against the city, challenging the plan’s constitutionality. Given the
current state of eminent domain law, which allows for eminent
domain to be exercised for the public purpose of economic
development, some argue that Richmond’s plan passes
constitutional scrutiny.8 However, this use pushes the boundaries
of legitimate exercise of eminent domain, even under the
majority opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, Conn, which
confirmed that economic development is proper grounds for
states to exercise eminent domain. 9
Upholding the constitutionality of the Richmond plan would
be inconsistent with the purpose of the doctrine of eminent
domain, which allows for taking of private land for public use.
Furthermore, such a move would animate the fears voiced by the
critics of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New
London, Conn, including the concern that eminent domain would
be used to disproportionate advantage certain individuals with
little justifiable public benefit. 10 Finally, Richmond’s particular use
of eminent domain may lead to lender backlash as lenders may
increase the rates on mortgages in cities that have used eminent
domain in order to hedge against the risk of government seizure.

6.
Jacob Gershman, Is Mortgage Seizure Plan a Win-Win or Lose-Win?, WSJ L. BLOG
(Aug. 8, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/08/08/is-mortgage-seizure-plan-awin-win-or-lose-win/.
7.
Marc Joffe, Richmond, CA's Eminent Domain Mortgage Scheme Could Set An
Ugly National Precedent, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/reals
pin/2013/09/05/richmond-cas-eminent-domain-mortgage-scheme-could-set-an-uglynational-precedent/.
8.
See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 474 (2005).
9.
Id. at 484.
10. Id. at 483; Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London:
An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491,
544 (2006) (“[T]here is always a risk that the claimed public benefit relied upon to justify
the taking is ‘merely incidental’ to the true benefits accruing to the benefited private
transferee; in other words, ‘that the underlying program is . . . a ruse.’”).
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In response to Richmond’s proposed course of action, state
legislatures should amend eminent domain laws to prohibit the
use of eminent domain to buy underwater mortgages. Instead of
using the power of eminent domain to solve the foreclosure
problem, states should approach lenders with moral-hazardreducing principal reduction plans for homeowners who are on
the edge of default and demonstrate inability to pay. These plans
would include features that will reduce the risk that homeowners
nearing foreclosure will cease making mortgage payments once
they believe that the government will buy and refinance their
loan. This plan would provide a fix for those on the verge of
default.
I. Background

A. The Mortgage Crisis
The early 2000s saw a boom in the housing markets and rapid
growth in subprime mortgage lending. In fact, the yearly
percentage of subprime mortgages of all mortgages issued
increased from nearly eight percent in 2003 to twenty percent in
2006. 11 Many see the boom in subprime mortgage lending as the
central cause of the housing crisis. 12 Subprime loans, because they
are loans made to individuals with poor credit history,
demonstrate a higher risk of default than prime loans made to
borrowers with better credit. 13 Thus, these loans are given higher
interest rates to hedge against the increased risk of default. Many
agree that a pattern of deregulation and predatory lending
practices led to unhealthy growth of the subprime mortgage
market. 14 With increased access to mortgages came increased
demand for housing and home prices were artificially inflated.

11. Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the
Social Capital Response, 56 C LEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 282 (2008).
12. See, e.g., Richard E. Gottlieb & Vivian I. Kim, Eminent Domain: Will Local
Governments Attempt to Use This Extraordinary Power to Purchase Troubled Residential
Mortgages?, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., 1, 2 (Nov. 2012).

13. Subprime loans are classified in contrast to Prime loans, where borrowers match
credit history requirements set out by the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) like
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Adam B. Ashcraft, Til Schuermann, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
STAFF REP. No. 318, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT 2
(2008).
14. See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 11, at 288.
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In late 2007, the housing bubble burst. 15 Home prices
plummeted and foreclosure rates skyrocketed as owners either
failed to make the high payments that they had agreed to or chose
to walk away from homes that were now worth far less than the
money owed on the home’s mortgage. As a result, Richmond and
similar cities suffer from a glut of empty, bank-owned homes.
These vacant homes are a breeding ground for crime and
negatively affect the value of neighboring properties. 16 In order to
keep homes with underwater mortgages from joining the stock of
vacant properties, Richmond proposed to use eminent domain to
buy and refinance underwater mortgages.

B. Current State of Eminent Domain Law
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states
that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” 17 Courts have struggled to determine what
exactly constitutes a “public use.” 18 The court rejected the idea that
the public use means that the seized property must actually be
used by the general public. 19 Since the early 1900s, the Supreme
Court has equated the concept of public use with the broader idea
that property can be taken for a public purpose. 20 In Berman v.
Parker, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Act.21 This plan, where Congress used
eminent domain to acquire private, blighted property in order to
15. Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 126 (2009) (“Home

prices reached their peak in the 2nd quarter of 2006 . . . foreclosure start rates increased . . .
by 75 percent in 2007 compared to 2006.”).
16. Lydia DePillis, Wall Street has so far Crushed a Drastic Foreclosure Fix: One
California Town Could Change That, WASH. POST W ONKBLOG (Sept. 10, 2013; 11:45 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/10/wall-street-has-so-farcrushed-a-drastic-foreclosure-fix-one-california-town-could-change-that/.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment was incorporated as against the states
in land without just compensation in Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
241 (1897).
18. Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657,
661 (2006).
19. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (“In discussing
what constitutes a public use, it recognized the inadequacy of use by the general public as a
universal test.”)
20. See, Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S.
30, 32 (1916) (equating “public use” and “public purpose” by stating, “If that purpose is not
public, we should be at a loss to say what is. The inadequacy of use by the general public as
a universal test is established.”).
21. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954).
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redevelop or sell the land to private developers, was deemed to
serve a public purpose. 22 In Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, the
Court held that the Hawaii Land Reform Act’s practice of
breaking up large estates by using eminent domain to purchase
and then sell land to individuals who had held leases to small
portions of the large estates qualified as a public purpose. 23
Relying on Berman and Midkiff, the Supreme Court, in the
controversial Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., affirmed the
City of New London, Connecticut’s development plan that would
pass real property from a private owner to a private developer. 24
The Court held that the city had “carefully formulated an
economic development plan that it believes will provide
appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no
means limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue.” 25 The
broad public use definition applied in Kelo is consistent with prior
applications by the Court. 26 However, critics of the Kelo decision
found it unsettling that private actors could disproportionately
gain from the use of eminent domain, whereby land is only
supposed to be taken for public use or purpose, and could possibly
do so based on political influence. 27

Kelo, explicitly and implicitly, asked for a state legislative
reaction. Justice Stevens wrote in the majority opinion that
“nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.” 28 Today, fortythree states have enacted post-Kelo statutes to limit their use of
eminent domain. 29 Statutory reactions to Kelo have varied. For
example, the Michigan legislature amended its constitution in
2006 to expressly state that “‘[p]ublic use’ does not include the
taking of private property for transfer to a private entity for the
purpose of economic development or enhancement of tax
22. Id. at 32 (“Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”).
23. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984).
24. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 474 (2005).
25. Id. at 483.
26. Corinne Calfee, Kelo v. City of New London: The More Things Stay the Same, the
More They Change, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 567 (2006)
27. Carol L. Zeiner, Eminent Domain Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: Private Benefit
Masquerading as Classic Public Use, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21 (2010).
28. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
29. Enacted Legislation Since Kelo, CASTLE COALITION, http://www.castlecoalition.org/i
ndex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=510 (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
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revenues.” 30 California experienced more moderate reforms with
comparably broad blight exceptions for the use of eminent
domain to seize properties in areas of poor economic health. 31 This
blight exception allows for seizure of properties in the name of
economic development, if the property meets meet certain
physical conditions, like “incompatible land uses that prevent the
development of those parcels or other portions of the project area”
and economic criteria, such as “[d]epreciated or stagnant property
values,” and “[a]bnormally high business vacancies.” 32
III. Using Eminent Domain to Purchase Underwater
Mortgages is Inconsistent with the Public Purpose Test
Based on Kelo’s expansive definition of public purpose
Richmond’s plan arguably may pass constitutional muster.
Helping individuals avoid foreclosure may reduce community
crime rates, limit the price deflationary impact that vacant homes
have on a community, and help the community appear
economically viable to potential investors. These goals are
consistent with Kelo’s holding that “[p]romoting economic
development is a traditional and long-accepted governmental
function, and there is no principled way of distinguishing it from
the other public purposes.” 33
However, this plan represents an extension of eminent domain
that would disproportionately benefit a few homeowners and
private investors in a way that is inconsistent with eminent
domain’s purpose and with the public benefit test. In his majority
opinion in Kelo, Justice Stevens wrote that deferential, rational
basis review of states’ use of eminent domain “does not . . . alter
the fact that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular,
favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual
public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.” 34 The use
of eminent domain to target a few individual homeowners and a
private investment company flirts with this idea of “favored
private entities” because, through this plan, the city is targeting a
30. MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2.
31. Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1931, 1934 (2007).
32. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2132 (2009) (discussing California Senate Bill 1206).
33. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 470.
34. Id. at 490.
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few underwater mortgages under the guidance of Mortgage
Resolution Partners (MRP), a private investment group. The city
and MRP are picking winners and losers, and there is evidence
that this selectivity is not wholly based on targeting blighted
areas, as the plan includes the condemnation of mortgages on
homes worth over a million dollars. 35 States and local
governments should not be allowed to target a few lucky
individuals who are selected to have their mortgage payments
reduced. This plan will benefit few homeowners who are on the
edge of default, but any general public purpose is merely
secondary.
MRP also seeks to benefit substantially from this plan. MRP
will pay the upfront cost of buying the mortgages and will charge
$4,500 to refinance each condemned mortgage. 36 On top of this
fee, the investment group will also profit from the refinanced
loans. For example, it has been speculated that the purchase of a
$300,000 mortgage on a home now worth $150,000 may yield
around $25,000 in profit to be split by the city and MRP.37 Profit to
this multi-state private enterprise does not serve an actual public
purpose. Although Kelo affirmed that eminent domain could be
used to pass property to private developers, there must be some
underlying public purpose at the end. 38 Here, the purported public
purpose at the base of MRP’s plan is secondary to the
disproportionate gains felt by a few homeowners.
IV. This Use of Eminent Domain will Cause Negative Practical
Repercussions
It is very likely that this plan will bring negative repercussions
for future investors who seek to borrow money from banks to
mortgage properties located in cities that have used eminent
domain in this way. Banks may be hesitant to give loans in areas
where mortgages have been seized by eminent domain, or they
might still give out loans but at higher interest rates in order to

35. Carolyn Said, Pricey Homes in Richmond's Eminent Domain Plan, S.F. CHRONICLE
(Aug. 20, 2013; 4:56 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Pricey-homes-inRichmond-s-eminent-domain-plan-4745146.php.
36. Id.
37. Nick Timiraos & Jeannette Neumann, Richmond’s Seizure Plan Complicated by
Size of Mortgages, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2013, 7:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/20
13/08/15/richmonds-seizure-plan-complicated-by-size-of-mortgages/.
38. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478.
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combat the risk of government seizure. 39 One Security Industry
and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) executive commented
that “the use of eminent domain confronts lenders and investors
with an unquantifiable new risk, which will reduce the amount of
credit available to potential homeowners.” 40 If enough
governments seek to use eminent domain in this way “it is
possible that lenders would react by changing the terms of
housing credit nationwide, rather than focusing a reaction on
individual communities.” 41
Finally, the Richmond plan induces moral hazard. If the City
of Richmond acts in this capacity, then homeowners who are
underwater on their mortgages may stop making payments in the
hopes that the government will seize and refinance their
mortgage. Other refinance options (discussed below) may be
available to reduce the moral hazard that may create incentives
for owners to avoid default.
V. Recommended Reforms

A. States Should Ban the Use of Eminent Domain for
Purchasing Private Mortgages
First, in order to regulate the use of eminent domain proposed
by the City of Richmond, state legislatures should modify state
eminent domain law to prohibit seizure mortgages. State
legislation should indicate, using the following model language,
that “in order to ensure that the public purpose behind eminent
domain is served, eminent domain shall not be used for the
purchase of individual homeowner mortgages.” Although states
have passed post-Kelo eminent domain reform, they have not
specifically addressed the potential use at issue in Richmond. 42 It
is evident that this use is inconsistent with the public purpose test
and will be harmful to mortgage owners if applied.

39. Ngai Pindell, Nevada's Residential Real Estate Crisis: Local Governments and the
Use of Eminent Domain to Condemn Mortgage Notes, 13 NEV. L.J. 888, 902 (2013).
40. Gottlieb, supra note 12, at 6 (quoting Press Release, SIFMA, SIFMA Opposes Use
of Eminent Domain; Will Cause Irreparable Damage to Recovering Housing Market (Sept.
7, 2012), available at http://www.sifma.org/news/news.aspx?id=8589940215).
41. Pindell, supra note 39, at 902.
42. Id. at 898.
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State legislatures are in the best position to install this ban on
the use of eminent domain to purchase private mortgages. First,
states are experienced in and familiar with the eminent domain
issues facing a post-Kelo world. It would be sensible and relatively
simple for them to incorporate the proposed limit into their
existing post-Kelo regulatory framework. Second, regulating this
issue on the state level will allow for states to ban this use of
eminent domain that is inconsistent with the public purpose test,
while maintaining legitimate uses of eminent domain for blight
removal and other public purposes based on each state’s priorities.
Finally, eminent domain falls within the state’s police power. 43
The state is in the best position to operate its police power, within
the federal Constitutional limits. The Supreme Court recognizes
this in their eminent domain jurisprudence by instituting a
“longstanding policy of deference” to state and local legislatures
to operate within the doctrines Constitutional limits. 44

B. States Should Approach Banks with Moral-Hazard Reducing
Principal Reduction Plans
Although this Comment does not address the broader policy
reforms that are necessary to ensure that the mortgage crisis does
not occur again, it is obvious that forward-looking reform of
predatory lending practices, loan securitization markets, and
individual borrowing requirements need to be implemented.
Within the scope of this Comment’s proposed reform is the
immediate effect that the Richmond plan seeks to effectuate:
helping those who are already underwater on their mortgages.
This is an important goal, as underwater mortgages default at a
higher rate, suffer the greatest losses at liquidation, and
negatively impact both local and large economies.45
The Richmond plan is right in that principal reduction is the
key to helping homeowners on the edge of default. It is evident
that many of the homes with underwater mortgages will not
regain their bubble-level prices. 46 For mortgages on the edge of
43. Robert Hockett, It Takes A Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local
Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 160 (2012).
44.
45.
46.

Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
Hockett, supra note 43, at 135.
Id. at 136.
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default, held by those who can demonstrate an inability to pay,
principal reduction would offer a mutually beneficial solution for
banks and homeowners. 47 Often banks will collect more from
payments on reduced mortgages than they would collect if
homeowners walked away from their underwater mortgage.
Especially given low home prices, low demand, and glut of
foreclosed houses in cities like Richmond, it is unlikely that banks
will be able to quickly resell foreclosed homes. 48 Homeowners
stand to gain because they will be able to stay in their homes, with
a more feasible mortgage payment.
Approaching banks with moral-hazard reducing principal
reduction agreements, as well as political pressure from state
legislatures, could lead to principal reduction without distorting
eminent domain. Such principal reduction agreements have been
made in the past, but only on a small scale. 49 Banks will be more
likely to agree to principal reduction under moral-hazard
reducing schemes because they are currently hesitant to decrease
principals for some individuals out of the fear that others will
cease payments of their mortgage in the hopes of securing a
principal reduction. A plan that would reduce this risk is one that
allows for a gradual reduction of the principal, contingent on
steady payments being made. 50 This contingency reduction
encourages homeowners to make payments and provides lenders
with some insurance of the borrower’s intention to pay. Another
plan includes a “shared equity plan,” such that the principal is
decreased but the bank can stand to recover a portion of the value
if the price of the property increases in the future. 51

47. Yuki Noguchi, Fannie, Freddie Won't Write Down Mortgage Principal, NPR (Feb.
29, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/29/147635014/fannie-freddie-wont-writedown-mortgage-principal.
48. Id. (Discussing how banks “make the decision that refinance and principal
reduction is more financially advantageous to them than foreclosure or short sale”).
49. An agreement with the five largest banks and the government lead to a twenty
billion dollar reduction in principals, but represented a mere, ‘“drop in the bucket’
compared with the approximately $700 billion in negative equity that Americans carry on
their homes.” Scott Neuman, The Mortgage Deal: A Reality Check, NPR (Feb. 9, 2012, 4:19
PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/09/146654318/the-mortgage-deal-a-reality-check).
50. Nin-Hai Tseng, 3 Ways to Write Down Mortgages Without Moral Hazard, CNN
MONEY (Mar. 28, 2012; 11:57 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/03/28/principalmortgage-reduction/.
51. Id.
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Politicians should approach both Government Sponsored
Enterprises (GSE) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are
privately owned banks that operate under a congressional charter
for a public purpose (to provide liquidity, stability and
affordability to targeted areas of the mortgage market) and other
private banks. 52 GSEs hold a number of mortgages that could be
written down.53 Last year, GSE banks declared that they would not
allow for principal reduction but would instead opt for alternative
loan restructuring methods. 54 However, approaching GSEs and
other banks with moral-hazard reducing schemes might
incentivize them to agree to reductions for those who can
demonstrate inability to pay. Banks will be more likely to agree to
schemes that protect against the risk of massive defaults in
reliance on reduction, just as they are more likely to agree to
plans like the contingent reduction arrangement or the shared
equity plan that give banks a greater chance of making more
money in the long-run. Also, forcing borrowers to prove inability
to pay and keeping them on the hook for reasonable payments
consistent with the value of the home reduces the risk that others
borrowers will strategically stop payments in hopes of getting a
smaller principal. Finally, lenders will be more inclined to give
principal reductions if there is a lesser chance that homeowners
will cease payment in reliance on a government initiated
refinance plan.
VI. Conclusion
There is no doubt that relief is required for cities like
Richmond. However, the use of eminent domain to purchase
mortgages is not the proper method to solve the foreclosure crisis.
Using eminent domain to buy individual homeowner mortgages
benefits a few homeowners and investors disproportionally,
making the public benefit secondary.
Also, a plan like
Richmond’s may backfire and cause more harm than good by
inadvertently facilitating more restrictions and high interest rates
on loans given in areas that have employed loan-seizure plans.
Local leaders in areas disproportionally affected by the housing
crisis should channel the political power of their state or national

52. Government Sponsored Enterprises, FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=33 (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
53. Hockett, supra note 43, at 144.
54. Noguchi, supra note 47.
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legislators to approach banks with moral-hazard-reducing,
principal-reduction plans. Perhaps the Richmond plan will shed
light on the dire state of foreclosure-heavy cities and help give
municipalities the political pressure necessary to negotiate
principal-reduction plans with banks.

